Back to the future: constitutional reforms of political institutions for a REAL turning point from the past and its napoleonic-aristocratic interferences
BACK TO THE FUTURE: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR A REAL TURNING POINT FROM THE PAST AND ITS NAPOLEONIC-ARISTOCRATIC INTERFERENCES
🌟 Introduction
This section is part of a broader context of much-needed and urgent structural reforms that have been waiting too long to be implemented, as described in this article. Although it contains details specific to Italy, the general aspects outlined therein apply to many countries, starting with some in continental Europe, followed by others in the rest of the world.
I have carried out an overview of the systems of government in other countries, including some infographics on the US system, which I will leave below for your reference. Meanwhile, as far as Italy is concerned, in order to put into practice all my good intentions, and hopefully those of as many 'awakened' people as possible, priority must be given to reforms that protect legitimate governments from possible interference by other institutions that are alien to a modern concept of politics, where I find that the normal 'weights' of politics are decisively counterbalanced by military ones. To explore this topic further, it would be useful to conduct separate comparative analyses with the organization of government systems in other countries that are more capable of maintaining more effective rule of law, such as the more strictly parliamentary republicst han Italy, which, as we will see below, does not represent these cases. Of course, we must always bear in mind, as history teaches us, the inherently evolutionary nature of politics itself, and, among other things, take a look at the various
institutional competences and related entities of the United States. This, of course, is regardless of the fact that governments themselves can 'do damage'. However, upon closer analysis of the Italian case, I do not know to what extent the Constituent Assembly of 1946 wanted the figure of the President of the Republic
'essentially' as a representative of national unity (essentially of Italians) and as an 'arbitrator' or guarantor of the Constitution
without any further extension of powers, given that we must carefully consider its historical and current form, where he has a whole series of functions (and here is an overview), established in different parts of the current Constitution, which favor his role as an actor of interference in political action. Therefore, in my opinion, based on the organization of the Italian political system, these are powers that confer on the Head of State, real extra powers, which can be deduced from those that you will see underlined in the list below. First of all, I invite you to seriously consider some of them: those of Head of the Armed Forces (in other strictly parliamentary republics, this power is held by a President-Prime Minister) and President of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (an administrative body of self-government, with the exception of its president, of the judiciary).There are also other functions which, although 'indirectly', strengthen his role in political decision-making, even though Article 89 of the Constitution requires ministers to countersign presidential acts. Some of his powers are a guarantee, some are 'with reservation', and some are not very significant. I will list them here for the benefit of most readers: he appoints one third of the members of the Constitutional Court, ratifies international treaties subject to parliamentary authorization, declares a state of war decided by the Chambers, can dissolve the Chambers, calls elections, appoints the Prime Minister and Ministers, appoints up to five senators for life, promulgates laws (with the possibility of sending them back to Parliament) and issues decrees having the force of law and regulations, authorizes the presentation of government bills to Parliament, calls referendums, and appoints certain high-ranking state officials. So, given the powers given to him, which are concentrated in this monocratic institution (meaning it's a single body made up of just one person) and self-determined (there are no oversight mechanisms for his actions), which is currently the President of the Republic, about whom, as I said before, I have my doubts on its definition as essentially a "representative" and an "arbitrator" or a "guarantor," these often and unhindered result in powers of political direction, despite the fact that some, whether partisan or not, would have us believe otherwise: proof of this is the long history of various interferences in Italian politics by the Head of State, of which I will shortly mention some of the most recent and representative episodes. Moreover, for the more attentive, I have already previously evoked the legacy of a historical figure from the past... Various episodes in our history could therefore only confirm a power parallel to that of the government, Parliament, and the judiciary (among the most prominent examples I have gleaned from online AI sources are the mandates of Giovanni Gronchi, Francesco Cossiga, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, Giorgio Napolitano, and Sergio Mattarella, to which I would add Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who was in office during that sinister political period of the 'sinistri' [leftists], which I discussed in the dedicated paragraph). Along with this article, which will please some and displease others, but here it is not the purpose of these interventions by the presidential institution that interests us now, but rather how these episodes, among the most recent, are very representative of the interference of heads of state (which is why I propose radical reforms to this problem below), I leave here a brief list of historical analyses on the subject for those who wish to learn more, almost all English:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
From the previous examination of that infamous period in European history, corroborated by significant statistical data from my own research correlating forms of government around the world with the presence or absence of more than one national police force, we therefore have evidence that, in addition to the phenomenon of the spread of the Gendarmerie, the Presidents of the republics of those countries whose governments are organized in certain ways, such as Italy, also present aspects inherited from the monarchs of the Conservative Order, which in turn were inherited from Napoleon, and these presidents have powers of influence over the main institutional bodies, the government, parliament, and the judiciary: so I see Italy's political system as having certain similarities with a semi-presidential republic, guess what? French-style, which has a diarchic structure in the management of executive power, split between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister [external note], with some differences compared to France, where the President of the Republic is elected by the people, like Parliament, and his term of office has been reduced to 5 years ⁹.
According to a definition that is unfortunately
widely accepted, Italy has a parliamentary republic form of government, as classified by Wikipedia itself, but, perhaps for reasons of brevity, it presents categories in general terms (the same entry in English has a few more), which gloss over the many variations/details that exist on a case-by-case basis (with the extreme case being that each state or community would be a category in itself), although this aspect is discussed in the text of the referenced entry. Moreover, in Italy, a nation with many dark, nuanced aspects, which no ruling class has ever escaped, and with which the Cupola generally 'wallow', our 'hybrid' political system presents shady areas that are unacceptable for a true republic. I would therefore define Italy as a parliamentary republic, at least with reservations.
The issue is complex and of the utmost importance, yet first and foremost, we need to thoroughly review the institutions of the presidents of certain countries: transform them into more collegial, directorial bodies, in a popular sense, or implement, to use a metaphor that has gained some traction among those interested in politics (which, unfortunately, not many people cultivate) and conveys the idea, a form of 'counterweight' that is currently lacking in this institution (in France, a sort of balance between their two executive bodies can only be expressed in periods of cohabitation, which are now much less likely after a reform of the electoral calendar and the length of the presidential term), but for me, if we consider these options mutually exclusive, the first one would be better.
Alternatively, following comparative analyses with other countries around the world where other forms of government have been tested to a reasonable extent, like Germany, Ireland, Iceland, India, and many Commonwealth nations that have maintained clearer distinctions between ceremonial and executive authority, we should consider whether the constitutional reform should go further, providing for a more 'parliamentary' reorganization, in which a possible Head of State either has a purely representative/ceremonial role, and executive power would be exclusively held by a Prime Minister-President with his ministers, whose acts would be scrutinized by Parliament and other existing bodies (which I will mention), or this institution would be abolished.
Therefore, in order to progress towards a more realistic Republic, in addition to the reform of the police force, institutional reforms of historic significance are needed for Italy and other nations that have been left behind.
Now, I am not an expert in any humanistic discipline assisted by lawyers and other technical professionals useful for this purpose who truly have ideas for innovation
(which should be the norm rather than the exception), but in short, there are complex but urgent issues for which working committees have already been set up in the past to address such important matters, without producing results: so here we would need round tables for a 're-constitutional assembly', with additional synthesis capabilities to avoid impractical complexities: I am going to make here an empirical reasoning, that involves reforms revising Part 2 of the current Constitution.
Therefore, starting from this 'confused' Italian political reality, in my opinion one of the priority solutions is a parliamentary appointment of governments without the presidential passage for the more or less "formal" appointment of the Prime Minister and Ministers, and the protection of their pre-established temporal stability, obviously regardless of their political 'color', naturally with maximum time limits for each term of office, but as we will see in more detail, in cases of re-election, I propose gradually decreasing periods. In this regard, the current italian government (2025) proposes universal suffrage for the election of the head of government but, as with the direct election of a head of state (as in France), based on what has been discussed above regarding democracy, I am uncertain how much this would resolve the issues. Here I am dealing with urgent issues and calling for practical and effective proposals to be tested, and I repeat, without any political partisanship: I believe that the advantage of averting politically unacceptable external interference in the main political bodies is a priority.
Continuing the discussion, beyond comparisons with other 'demilitarized' nations, for the sake of brevity I will limit myself to considering the hypothesis, which, as already mentioned, is one of the possible options, that goes in the direction of a significantly 'parliamentary' republic, with the replacement of those
historical functions that we have seen to be the prerogative of the President of the Italian Republic with more 'widespread' and 'dispersed' (but not too much so) bodies/entities.
Thus, in order to supervise the work of the executive and legislative powers, to begin with, the relative balance of power between the government and parliament could be well modulated. Then, as regards who elects the Constitutional Court ², which is the most important institution guaranteeing the constitutionality of laws in Italy, an issue that I consider very delicate, in my (not so modest) opinion, the power of the President of the Republic to appoint one third of the members would either be abolished (in which case half of the members would be appointed by Parliament and the rest by the higher courts), or would be assigned to some collegial body of another legal nature competent to indicate personalities suitable for the guidelines referred to in note 2a (taking cues from the previous discussion on democracy, I would suggest candidates who are experts in the humanities). Then, still speaking as a non-expert, I would propose that it have the power to take its own initiative in cases where the Constitutional Court itself deems it necessary to intervene. With regard to another sensitive issue, namely the need to 'mediate' or 'arbitrate' on the proper management of the constitutional autonomy of the judiciary, a role now assigned to the President of the Republic in his capacity as President of the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, there would probably be more debate on how to replace this function: for example, whether as an individual or collegial body (in this case, a more collective presidency would add bureaucratic complexity), composed of whom, whether it would also be a supervisory body, and if collegial, whether composed of legal entities of different natures, etc. Similar questions apply to who would elect the president(s), since they would have to be elected by someone independent of the C.S.M. itself. A few words about the work of magistrates (but also lawyers, who I understand are rightly well paid; in my opinion, there should also be public lawyers who are equally well paid): their work requires, first and foremost, impeccable moral integrity (as already mentioned for intelligence services), and think about it, they play a highly responsible role (even more so in criminal proceedings), for some there is a high personal risk, combined with what I believe to be a very demanding commitment, so they must not only be paid a lot (as public doctors must be), but the judicial work organization must also ensure that possible (and perhaps currently probable) work overload is avoided (there is a technical term for this, Occupational burnout): are there enough judges in Italy for the workload of the proceedings? No? Let's hire them with assistants and support staff. It's a matter of protecting those who already work and ensuring fair rights for everyone.
Having closed this parenthesis, continuing with the case of possible reforms towards a parliamentary republic, if some people, and currently it will not be a few, think that the abolition of the office of President of the Republic seems too much, I would say to them that consideration could be given to maintaining this institutional figure in a purely representative role for the nation.
For the sake of completeness with regard to the current institutional control bodies, I would like to mention also other organs provided for in the Constitution in the Italian political system
(here is more detailed in italian), which, taken together, have jurisdictional, control, public audit, advisory, and executive powers (i.e., they can impose mandatory actions), such as the Council of State
³ (which is also the court of appeal for decisions of the Regional Administrative Courts) with regard to
administrative acts, the Court of Auditors⁴ with jurisdiction over public accounting matters, and, at a more purely advisory and monitoring level, the National Council for Economics and Labor (CNEL)⁵, with powers of legislative initiative and the faculty to contribute to the drafting of legislation on economic and social matters. it should be noted here that towards the end of 2016 this body came to the forefront of Italian public opinion, as its abolition was provided for in the Renzi-Boschi constitutional reform, which was then rejected by a constitutional referendum. The list of these bodies is completed by the controversial Consiglio Supremo di Difesa ⁶.
In conclusion, I would like to mention cases in which binding consultative power is vested in the people, through the institution of the abrogative referendum and, in constitutional matters, through the institution of the confirmatory referendum on constitutional laws (for an overview, see this this section of a Wikipedia entry).
If a more general revision were to be considered, moving towards a broader reform of the organization of at least certain parts of the Italian political system, I imagine a concerted effort by cleverly devised political bodies inspired by ideas such as control, guarantee, supervision, and mediation, by and between different public institutions, also including/reviewing more or less the current ones (for example, we have auditors),
with a possible Head of State having only representative/ceremonial functions,
and introducing where necessary arbitration panels similarly to probity arbitrators, juries, auditors and 'peer reviewers' without policy-making powers, and certainly without functions such as presiding over the Armed Forces and others such as those specifically underlined
above with regard to the Head of State in its current form, all without overburdening the bureaucratic machine.
Finally, I will not elaborate here on questions such as who controls the controllers (but then who controls the controllers of the controllers? Or: what mutual control mechanisms should be introduced? Etc.), since it is impossible to control everything, seeking a balanced synthesis so as not to undermine decision-making capacity and timing: we could simply say that it would be 'too much bureaucracy of bureaucracy'. Perhaps this will be the subject of a separate post with technical details, which I will link to here.
In addition, these desired reforms will provide for well-modulated limits on the number and duration of the mandates of a President-Prime Minister, i.e., on his or her overall term of office, in order to control potential autocratic tendencies. As for the duration of terms of office, refining the ideas a little, the term of office of the same Prime Minister could be set in sub-periods of progressively decreasing duration, for example 5 then 3 then 2 years or 4-3-2-1 years (a longer term at the beginning would take into account the 'start-up' phase, and subsequently a progressively shorter term would serve as a moment of reassessment: if, after a certain period, the voters like him, he will be re-elected, otherwise, in the case of a new government, the sub-periods will start again, until the next electoral reassessment) with a maximum limit of, say, 10 years in office for each Prime Minister. Other aspects will then be dealt with, such as possible cases of no confidence/resignations/interruptions of governments for any reason. And I would not expect prohibitive increases in organizational and electoral costs, even with a greater use of proven technology, such as televoting systems at polling stations, with verification systems using digital signatures.
Then, if any readers have better solutions to the big problem of illegitimate interference in political institutions, I would be happy to hear them.
Then, of course, there are lobbies and historical and non-historical power brokers. For example, I have good reason to believe that oil and other lobbies are still active. However, I personally do not believe in what have been highlighted as conspiracy theories, such as the Kalergi Plan, reptilians, and the 'villains' George Soros and Bill Gates (beyond the opinions expressed by the figures mentioned here, the conspiracy theory concept is to see them as those who are plotting something, but no one has ever proven these 'conspiracies'; rather, it seems to me that there is someone who feeds them, as I mentioned earlier), the 'powerful' World Economic Forum, mysterious treaties, etc., which in my opinion are more distractions when not misdirection of public opinion: I don't think the real Cupolas should be sought in those places. To be a little more aware of them, I will mention some other powers that influence political decisions, both historical and real, such as the Pope and other religious authorities, certain Masonic lodges with their connections (in addition to the past Italian affairs of the 'P2 Lodge' (2) (3) (4) and 'P3-P4'), and the now fairly well-known Bilderberg Club. And about these 'parallel worlds', whether interconnected or not, there is fortunately now a wealth of investigative literature (of which I leave here a few examples (1) (2) (3), included a public 'network of archives'). Those who have the time to search around and carefully examine the sources can therefore educate themselves on the subject, given that ordinary citizens, if and when they become aware of such matters, usually do so after some time has passed, including following the declassification of confidential historical institutional documents.
Notes
2) The Constitutional Court judges any disputes on the constitutional legitimacy of the laws, and conflicts of attribution of powers between different organs of the State.
The ways in which it acts are in principal or
action, considered a prior action, and in an incidental or exception, considered a subsequent action; this does not provide for the Court to apply a 'motu proprio' principle, nor is it obliged to checks within its competence on each and every legislative enactment or act having the force of law.
Italy ratified the Treaty on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights and, in 2014, accepted the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
2a) [voters of the Constitutional Court] "This mixed structure is intended to give balance to the Constitutional Court: to foster this balance the constituent [Assembly] associates, in the composition of the body, the high technical-legal background and the necessary political sensitivity."
3) In the exercise of its advisory function, the Council of State provides opinions regarding the regularity and legitimacy, merit, and expediency of administrative acts of individual ministries, the Government as a collegial body, or regions.
In the judiciary, it has the function of tutelage [including of citizens] against the acts of the public administration. In particular, the Council of State is the second instance of administrative justice, i.e., the court of appeal against the decisions of the Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR). In addition, the Council of State functions as a single-degree judge in the judgment of compliance, that is, in that judgment aimed at obtaining that a public administration execute a judgment issued by the ordinary judge or the Council of State itself. [https://it.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consiglio_di_Stato_(Italia)#Attribuzioni_giurisdizionali]
4) Corte dei conti
5) Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL), a detailed description in Italian:
A description in English:
6) (Supreme Council of Defence (Italy))
"Its powers are largely delineated in negative terms, this is because in practice the majority of the practical decision-making powers mentioned in Law no.624/1950 actually belong to other institutions. In particular, those elements of the political process which relate to foreign affairs and military policy belong to the executive, and the Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for the formulation of strategic plans and the defence of the borders. As a result, the council limited to playing a consultative and advisory role to the Council of Ministers, much like an Inter-ministerial Committee." (cit. Wikipedia)
9) In France, an example historically taken as a reference by observers as a semi-presidential republic, the French executive power is given the appellation Bicephalous ('two brains', editor's note), shared between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, head of government, and France remains a parliamentary republic with (strong) presidential influence. A more accurate definition of the form of government could be a presidentialized parliamentary regime or a bi-representative parliamentary regime [external note], or we can still speak of, excluding periods of cohabitation, a presidential interpretation of the Constitution
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